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James H. Heller, with whom Douglas B. Huron was 
on the brief for appellant in No. 85-6052 and cross-
appellee in No. 85-6097. 
Stephen R. Tallent, with whom Wayne A. Schrader 
and Kathy Davidson Ireland were on the brief for ap-
pellee in No. 85-6052 and cross-appellant in No. 85-6097. 
Before: EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and 
JOYCE HENS GREEN,* District Judge. 
Opinion for the Court filed by District Judge GREEN. 
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS. 
GREEN, District Judge: In Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 
467 U.S. 69 ( 1984), the Supreme Court ruled for the 
first time that decisions concerning advancement to part-
nership are governed by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, 
and must therefore be made without regard to race, sex, 
religion, or national origin. This case, the first challenge 
to a partnership denial to reach us since Hishon, presents 
several novel and important questions that arise from 
the application of federal employment discrimination law 
to collegial bodies such as partnerships. Following a five-
day trial, the District Court found that Price Water-
house, one of the nation's largest accounting firms, had 
discriminated against plaintiff' Ann Hopkins by permit-
ting stereotypical attitudes towards women to play a 
significant, though unquantifiable, role in its decision not 
to invite her to become a partner. The court concluded 
that Hopkins was entitled to an award of backpay from 
the date she should have been elected partner until the 
date of her resignation seven months later, but ruled 
that, notwithstanding the parties' agreement to defer 
consideration of damages until after a decision on the 
issue of liability, Hopkins' failure to present any evi-
* Of the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292 
(a). 
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dence as to the amount of compensation she was due 
barred her from recovering all damages save attorneys' 
fees. The trial court further found that Hopkins had 
failed to establish that she had been constructively dis-
charged following Price Waterhouse's failure to make her 
a partner, and thus declined to award her backpay for 
the period subsequent to her resignation or to order Price 
Waterhouse to invite her to become a partner. The par-
ties cross-appealed.1  For the reasons set forth below, we 
affirm the District Court's determination of liability, but 
reverse its judgment as to the appropriate relief and re-
mand for further proceedings on this issue. 
I. 
A. Background 
Price Waterhouse is a professional partnership special-
izing in auditing, tax, and management consulting serv-
ices, primarily for private corporations and government 
agencies. The firm is known colloquially as one of the 
nation's "big eight" accounting firms; at the time this 
suit commenced, it had 662 partners working in 90 offices 
across the country. Price Waterhouse is managed by a 
Senior Partner and Policy Board elected by all the part-
ners. New partners are regularly drawn from the ranks 
of the firm's senior managers through a formal nomina-
tion and review process that culminates in a partnership-
wide vote. There are no formal limits on the number of 
persons who may be made partners in any one year. 
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1111 
(D.D.C. 1985). 
Plaintiff joined Price Waterhouse as a manager in 
August 1978 and began working in its Office of Govern-
ment Services (OGS) in Washington, D.C. She special-
1 For the sake of convenience, the court will ref er to the 
parties as plaintiff and defendant, rather than appellant, 
cross-appellee, and appellee, cross-appellant. 
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ized in preparing, securing, and managing contracts for 
large-scale computer-based systems designed specifically 
for government agencies. Plaintiff had previously worked 
at Touche Ross, another large accounting firm where her 
husband was also employed, but left because that firm's 
rules prohibited both husband and wife from being con-
sidered for partnership. Shortly after her departure, 
plaintiff's husband became a partner at Touche Ross. 
In order to hire her, Price Waterhouse waived one of its 
own rules that barred employment of anyone whose 
spouse was a partner in a competing firm. In 1981, how-
ever, the firm advised plaintiff that, because of her hus-
band's position at Touche Ross, she would not be eligible 
for partnership at Price Waterhouse. She threatened to 
resign and the matter was resolved only because Hopkins' 
husband left Touche Ross to set up his own consulting 
firm. Plaintiff was nominated for partnership a year 
later, in August 1982. 
There is no dispute that Hopkins was qualified for 
partnership consideration. She was exceptionally sucess-
ful in garnering business for the firm, winning contract 
awards with the Department of State and the Farmers 
Home Administration worth an estimated $34 to $44 
million to Price Waterhouse. The firm's Senior Partner, 
Joseph Connors, characterized one of these contracts-ai 
world-wide computerized system capable of handling all 
State Department financial transactions-as a "leading 
credential" that enabled the firm to win similar business 
from other federal agencies. The District Court expressly 
found that none of the other candidates considered for 
partnership in 1983 had generated more business for 
Price Waterhouse than plaintiff. 618 F. Supp. at 1112. 
In addition, she billed more hours than any of the other 
candidates under consideration. 
The partners in OGS formally initiated the admission 
process for plaintiff by nominating her for partnership 
in August 1982. In support of her candidacy OGS sub-
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mitted a flattering appraisal of her work, highlighting 
her "outstanding performance" in connection with the 
State Department project, and strongly urging her ad-
mission to the partnership. The appraisal stated in part: 
In her five years with the firm, she has demonstrated 
conclusively that she has the capacity and capability 
to contribute significantly to the growth and profit-
ability of the firm. Her strong character, independ-
ence and integrity are well recognized by her clients 
and peers. Ms. Hopkins has outstanding oral and 
written communication skills. She has a good busi-
ness sense, and ability to grasp and handle quickly 
the most complex issues, and strong leadership quali-
ties. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit ("PL Ex.") 15. 
After a local office such as OGS nominates one of its 
senior managers for partnership, Price Waterhouse circu-
lates the nominee's name and the accompanying appraisal 
of his or her work to all partners, who are invited to 
comment on the candidate. Those partners who have 
worked closely or extensively with a candidate submit 
"long-form" evaluations, while those whose contact has 
been more limited submit "short-forms." Partners are 
asked to rank individual nominees against all other candi-
dates in 48 categories; to indicate whether the individual 
should be admitted, rejected, or placed on hold; and to 
provide written comments explaining their recommenda-
tions. The Admissions Committee, an arm of the firm's 
Policy Board, reviews each candidate's personnel file and 
occasional1y interviews individual partners who have 
commented on a given candidate. The Committee then 
prepares a summary of the evaluations and makes its own 
recommendations to the Policy Board, providing a short 
written statement explaining any recommendation to hold 
or reject a candidate. The Policy Board in turn votes on 
whether the candidate should be included on the partner-
ship ballot, held for reconsideration, or rejected. The 
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Board can override the recommendations of the Admis-
sions Committee and evaluates candidates not only on the 
basis of their individual merit, but also in terms of the 
firm's business needs. Those candidates who receive the 
Board's approval are placed on the ballot for a partnership-
wide election; those who are not included are informed of 
the Board's reasons for rejecting or postponing their 
candidacies. 
Plaintiff was the only woman among the 88 candidates 
nominated for partnership in August 1982. Of these, 47 
were invited to join the partnership, 21 were rejected 
outright, and the remaining 20-including plaintiff-were 
placed on hold. Seventeen of the 19 men placed on hold 
were renominated the following year (the other two had 
been placed on two-year holds), and of these, 15 were 
ultimately admitted. OGS, however, did not renominate 
plaintiff. Of the thirty-two partners who submitted evalu-
ations and comments on her candidacy, fully a fourth 
opposed her admission; another three partners recom-
mended that she be held for reconsideration; and eight 
others stated that they lacked a sufficient basis upon which 
to form an opinion. 618 F. Supp. at 1113. Many of the 
comments from evaluating partners centered on Hopkins' 
apparent difficulties with staff, and both supporters and 
opponents of her candidacy characterized her as some-
times overly aggressive, unduly harsh, impatient with 
staff, and very demanding. 
A number of these complaints about plaintiff's lack of 
"interpersonal skills" were couched in terms of her sex. 
One critic suggested that Hopkins needed to take a "course 
at charm school." Pl. Ex. 21. A supporter sought to 
excuse her behavior by speculating that "she may have 
overcompensated for being a woman." Defendant's Ex-
hibit ("Def. Ex.") 31. A member of the Admissions 
Committee investigated a reference in Hopkins' personnel 
file about her use of profanity and testified that "several 
. . . partners" regarded her language as "one of the nega-
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tives." Transcript of Trial ("Tr.") 321. One supporter 
felt compelled to defend had on this subject, arguing that 
"[m] any male partners are worse than Ann (language 
and tough personality)"; this partner believed that the 
concerns over her profanity arose only "because she is a 
lady using foul language." Id. Another supporter opined 
that Hopkins initially came across as "macho," but con-
cluded that "if you get around the personality thing she's 
at the top of the list or way above average." Still an-
other supporter wrote that plaintiff "had matured from 
a tough-talking, somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr. 
to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing 
lady partner candidate." Pl. Ex. 21. 
Due to the large number of comments concerning her 
interpersonal skills, the Admissions Committee recom-
mended that Hopkins' candidacy be held for at least a 
year. The Policy Board concurred, noting that although 
plaintiff had "a lot of talent," she needed "social grace." 
Pl. Ex. 20. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff met with the 
firm's Senior Partner, Joseph Connor, to discuss the 
Board's decision, and he urged her to undertake a Quality 
Control Review, which would allow her to work with more 
partners, demonstrate her skills, and allay concerns about 
her ability to deal with staff. Prior to that meeting, 
Thomas Beyer, the head partner at OGS and perhaps 
Hopkins' most fervent supporter, discussed with her prob-
lems the Board had identified with her candidacy and the 
steps she might take to enhance her partnership prospects. 
Beyer advised her "to walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have 
her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 618 F. Supp. at 1117. 
Four months after she embarked on her Quality Con-
trol Review, however, the partners at OGS decided not to 
propose Hopkins for partnership. During the year follow-
ing her initial nomination, Hopkins lost the support of 
two of these partners, who had come to strongly oppose 
her candidacy. Although candidates have on occasion been 
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admitted despite the opposition of partners in their home 
offices, plaintiff's supporters at OGS felt that in view of 
the strong criticisms her earlier nomination had drawn, 
she could not possibly become a partner without the 
unanimous endorsement of her local office partners. Beyer 
advised plaintiff that it was very unlikely that she would 
ever be admitted to the partnership. He told her that 
she could remain at Price Waterhouse as a senior man-
ager, but one of the OGS partners who opposed her 
candidacy advised her to resign. That advice was con-
sistent with the regular practice and custom at Price 
Waterhouse, where candidates rejected for partnership 
routinely left. Hopkins resigned in January 1984 and 
set up her own consulting firm. 
B. Proceedings Below 
The District Court had no difficulty finding that plain-
tiff had presented a prima facie case of sex discrimina-
tion: she was a qualified partnership candidate, she was 
rejected, and Price Waterhouse continued to seek partners 
with her qualifications. 618 F. Supp. at 1113 (citing 
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 875 
(1984); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 ( 1981) ) . The court went on 
to find, however, that Price Waterhouse's consideration 
of Hopkins', or any other candidate's, interpersonal skills 
was a legitimate business inquiry, and that plaintiff's 
management style "provided ample justification for the 
complaints that formed the basis of the Policy Board's 
decision." 618 F. Supp. at 1114. The trial judge found 
that a number of the criticisms leveled at Hopkins be-
cause of her treatment of staff were in fact genuine. Id. 
In addition, the trial court concluded that the opposition 
of the two OGS partners to Hopkins' renomination was 
likewise based on genuine reservations about her man-
agement style rather than any animosity towards her 
because of her sex. Id. Finally, the District Court re-
jected Hopkins' contention that Price Waterhouse treated 
J 
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her differently than male candidates with abrasive or 
aggressive personalities. The trial judge concluded that 
the firm had legitimate, nondiscriminatory business rea-
sons for admitting two such candidates identified by 
plaintiff, and dismissed evidence she proffered as to the 
two other male candidates as "fragmentary" and other-
wise insufficient proof of disparate treatment.2 Id. at 
1115 & n.6. 
The trial court's finding of liability rested instead on 
its determination that Price Waterhouse had discrimi-
nated against Hopkins by filtering her partnership can-
didacy through a system that gave great weight to nega-
tive comments and recommendations, despite evidence that 
those comments reflected unconscious sexual stereotyping 
by male evaluators based on outmoded attitudes towards 
women. Id. at 1118-19. The District Court found that 
comments based on sexual stereotypes were "part of the 
regular fodder of partnership evaluations," yet Price 
Waterhouse took no steps to discourage sexism, to heighten 
the sensitivity of partners to sexist attitudes, or to in-
vestigate negative comments to ascertain whether they 
were the product of such attitudes. Id. at 1119. The 
trial judge acknowledged that it was impossible to meas-
ure the precise role sexual stereotyping had played in the 
Policy Board's decision to deny Hopkins partnership, 
but found that the decision was in fact tainted by dis-
criminatory evaluations that resulted from the firm's 
failure to root evident sexism from its evaluation system. 
2 The District Court also rejected Hopkins' evidence con-
cerning the very small .number of female partners at Price 
Waterhouse. The trial court found this evidence "wholly in-
conclusive" because it failed to indicate the percentage of 
female partners relative to the percentage of available quali-
fied women, and failed to take into account the fact that 
female partners presently at Price Waterhouse were selected 
over a long span of years during which the pool of qualified 
women changed dramatically. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 
618 F. Supp. 1109, 1116 (D.D.C. 1985). 
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Accordingly, the District Court determined that Price 
Waterhouse bore the burden of demonstrating by clear 
and convincing evidence that its decision would have been 
the same regardless of such discrimination-a showing 
the firm was unable to make. 
Having concluded that Hopkins was a victim of sexual 
discrimination, the trial judge went on to find that she 
was nevertheless not entitled to an order directing the 
firm to make her a partner. Applying the doctrine of con-
structive discharge to the professional partnership setting, 
the District Court determined that Hopkins' departure 
from Price Waterhouse was the result of neither in-
tolerable working conditions nor any aggravating circum-
stances such as a firm history of discrimination or undue 
humiliation. Id. at 1121. Although one OGS partner sug-
gested to plaintiff that she resign, the firm offered to 
retain her as a senior manager and several partners en-
couraged her to accept this option. Aside from her failed 
partnership bid, Hopkins had enjoyed an amicable and 
otherwise quite successful five years of employment with 
the firm. The trial court concluded that a discriminatory 
denial of partnership, without more, did not amount to 
a showing of constructive discharge and thus did not war-
rant the equitable relief Hopkins sought. Accordingly, the 
court denied her both backpay from the date of her 
resignation and a decree requiring that she be invited to 
join Price Waterhouse as a partner. The District Court 
also ruled that although plaintiff had demonstrated her 
entitlement to an award of backpay compensating her at 
the partnership salary for the period between her partner-
ship denial and her resignation, she had failed to offer 
any evidence as to the amount of compensation she should 
receive. The trial judge acknowledged that this failure 
was due solely to a stipulation the parties filed in which 
they agreed to defer resolution of the backpay issue until 
after the court rendered its liability determination; be-
cause that stipulation was filed without the court's knowl-
edge or approval, however, he deemed the issue closed and 
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refused to accept any post-trial evidence on the question. 
The court therefore awarded Hopkins judgment in the 
amount of her attorneys' fees only. 
The respective cross-appeals followed. 
II. 
A. The Liability Determination 
Price Waterhouse mounts two attacks on the District 
Court's determination that it discriminated against Hop-
kins in violation of Title VII. First, the firm contends 
that there is no competent evidence supporting the lower 
court's finding that impermissible sexual stereotyping in-
fected the partnership evaluation system. Second, Price 
Waterhouse argues that even if this finding is upheld, the 
liability determination still cannot stand because the lower 
court expressly found that Hopkins' behavior provided 
"ample justification" for the complaints about her lack of 
interpersonal skills, and that these complaints in turn con-
stituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason 
for placing Hopkins' candidacy on hold. Thus, the firm 
submits that even if the evaluation process has not been 
purged of sexist attitudes, those attitudes were not re-
sponsible for the decision to hold Hopkins for further con-
sideration, and therefore Hopkins has failed to establish 
any causation between the partnership's inappropriate 
treatment of female candidates and her own unsuccessful 
candidacy. 
1. The District Court's Findings 
As this court recently emphasized, appellate review of 
District Court findings in Title VII cases is necessarily 
narrow. Underwood v. District of Columbia Armory 
Board, 816 F.2d 769, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In order to 
overturn a determination of liability, we must conclude 
that it is "'based on an utterly implausible account of 
the evidence.'" Id. (quoting Bishopp v. District of Co-
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lumbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Faced 
with this formidable hurdle, Price Waterhouse eschews 
any intention of re-arguing its case on appeal: it purports 
to urge reversal not on the ground that the lower court's 
view of the evidence is implausible, but on the theory that 
there simply is no evidence supporting the District Court's 
finding of discrimination. Notwithstanding its disclaimer, 
however, defendant's attempt to demonstrate the absence 
of competent evidence proves, upon closer inspection, to be 
nothing more than a thinly disguised quarrel with the 
District Court over appropriate inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence before it. Given our narrow scope of 
review, and the reasonableness of the District Court's 
findings, we must reject that attempt. 
In concluding that Price Waterhouse's partnership 
evaluation system was infected by impermissible, sexually 
stereotyped attitudes toward women, the District Court 
relied on three principal pieces of evidence: ( 1) the com-
ments partners made about Hopkins herself; (2) the 
testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist and an 
expert in the field of stereotyping, who identified some 
of these comments as the product of sexual stereotyping; 
and (3) comments made about other women candidates 
in previous years. Defendant attempts to dismiss this 
evidence by isolating yarious comments and arguing that 
they are either irrelevant, sex-neutral, or otherwise not 
probative of discrimination. This piecemeal attack on the 
District Court's finding, however, ignores the fact that 
we must view the evidence in its entirety, and is in any 
event unequal to the task of demonstrating that the 
court's finding is clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1512 (1985). 
Price Waterhouse argues, for example, that the District 
Court could not have drawn any adverse inferences about 
the firm's evaluation system from statements describing 
Hopkins as "macho," "a somewhat masculine hard-nosed 
mgr," or a manager who "overcompensated for being a 
1 
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woman," because all these comments were made by those 
favoring her candidacy. That Hopkins' supporters made 
these statements, however, in no way undermines the 
District Court's finding that they reflect stereotypical 
thinking on the part of the commenters. Stereotypical 
attitudes that sometimes work to the advantage of women, 
such as the once unchallenged assumption that mothers 
are inhereutly superior parents and thus nearly always 
entitled to custody of children in divorce actions, are no 
less the product of archaic thinking than those attitudes 
that disadvantage women. The comments of Hopkins' 
supporters may or may not have harmed her candidacy,3 
but they are most certainly competent evidence that sex-
ist attitudes were present in the partnership selection 
process. Price Waterhouse also suggests that one part-
ner's comment that Hopkins needed to take a "course at 
charm school" is not sex-indicative, because charm is a 
quality admired both in men and women. This argu-
ment borders on the facetious. Charm is indeed an attri-
bute prized in men and women alike, but charm schools 
are and always have been exclusively female institutions.4 
3 We do not share Price Waterhouse's emphatic conviction 
that because the comments in question were made by her 
supporters, they could not possibly have hurt Hopkins' part-
nership prospects. Characterizing a female candidate as 
"macho" and "masculine" is certainly one way of qualifying, 
and thereby diluting, an endorsement. Supporters of a male 
candidate are very unlikely to describe that candidate in 
sexual terms, i.e., as "masculine," or to excuse character flaws 
as merely the result of 'overcompensating for being a man." 
Indeed, plaintiff's expert, Dr. Fiske, testified that these quali-
fying statements reflected a conscious effort on the part of 
the commenters to overcome their stereotypical attitudes and 
vote for Hopkins despite their disdain for her behavior. Tr. 
565. By couching their qualifications in terms of sexual stereo-
types, however, these supporters echoed the complaints. of 
Hopkins' critics, thereby lending credence to those complaints 
and unwittingly undermining the support they sought to 
provide. 
4 "Charm school" is a somewhat derogatory colloquialism 
for an institution formally known as a "finishing school." 
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The sexist import of the comment is patently clear, par-
ticularly as charm schools are inextricably linked, both 
historically and philosophically, with the antiquated no-
tion that women should devote their energies to social and 
cultural affairs rather than business or professional en-
deavors. See note 4 supra. 
Perhaps most telling is Price Waterhouse's desperate 
attempt to erase from the record Thomas Beyer's advice 
to Hopkins that she should "walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, 
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 618 F. Supp. at 
1117. The firm argues that the District Court erred in 
stating that Beyer was "responsible for telling her what 
problems the Policy Board had identified with her can-
didacy." Id. Price Waterhouse claims that this task 
officially fell to the firm's Senior Partner, Joseph Connor, 
who made no reference to Hopkins' femininity in his 
meeting with her following the Policy Board's decision 
to hold her candidacy. This contention not only rests on 
the artificial assumption that Beyer, the chief partner in 
Price Waterhouse's Washington office and Hopkins' lead-
ing supporter, would be kept completely in the dark as 
to the Policy Board's views on her candidacy, but is di-
rectly contradicted by the testimony of Roger Marcellin, 
a member of both the Policy Board and the Admissions 
Commitee at the time of Hopkins' nomination, who stated 
that he had "no doubt that Tom Beyer would be the one 
that would have to talk wit~ her [Hopkins]. He knew 
exactly where the problems were." Tr. 316. Beyer's ad-
vice, of course, speaks for itself. That he ardently sup-
ported her candidacy and had every motive to give her 
what he hoped would be helpful counsel simply under-
Webster's defines the latter as "a private school that pre-
pares young women for social life (by emphasizing cultural 
accomplishments and social graces) rather than for a voca-
tional or professional career." Webster's Third International 
New Dictionary (1968). 
1 
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scores the genuineness of his belief that Hopkins' failure 
to behave in a manner apparently expected of a woman 
by Price Waterhouse partners had damaged her partner-
ship bid. 
The District Court also rested its finding of discrim-
inatory sexual stereotyping on the testimony of Dr. Fiske, 
an expert in the field of stereotyping, who stated that the 
disappointed stereotypical expectations of male partners 
played a "major determining role" in the firm's decision 
not to make Hopkins a partner. Tr. 545. Disclaiming 
any intention of denigrating Dr. Fiske's field of exper-
tise, Price Waterhouse attempts to dismiss this evidence 
as "sheer speculation" of "no evidentiary value." Brief 
for Appellee-Cross Appellant at 31. This is so, the firm 
contends, because Dr. Fiske failed to compare the stereo-
typical comments made about Hopkins with similar com-
ments made about male candidates; she lacked informa-
tion concerning the authors of these comments; and she 
had never met Hopkins and had no idea what her con-
duct or behavior was like. However useful Price Water-
house might believe this information to be, Dr. Fiske 
made clear that experts in her field do not require such 
data in order to determine whether stereotyping is occur-
ring in a given employment context. Dr. Fiske testified 
that she was an expert at evaluating written comments, 
that reliance on such written documents was a standard 
practice in her field, and that she did not need to observe 
Hopkins or meet her critics because she had the entire 
universe of reactions to Hopkins before her, as well as 
comments the same partners made about male candidates. 
Tr. 595-96. This information, along with other "conver-
gent indicators" of stereotyping-such as the extremely 
small number of female partners at the firm; the absence 
of any other female candidates among the 88 nominated 
along with Hopkins; the exaggerated and extremely in-
tense negative reactions of Hopkins' critics to behavior 
that supporters perceived as positive; the ambiguous cri-
16 
teria the firm used to evaluate a candidate's personal 
qualities; the absence of complaints from Hopkins' clients; 
and the positive assessments of Hopkins in areas where 
performance could be measured objectively, (e.g., busi-
ness generation)-taken together provided Dr. Fiske a 
sufficient basis from which to draw her conclusions that 
Hopkins was the victim of stereotyping. To the extent 
that Price Waterhouse believes Dr. Fiske lacked neces-
sary information, the firm is in fact quarreling with her 
field of expertise and the methodology it employs. De-
fendant, however, failed to challenge the validity of Dr. 
Fiske's discipline at trial and disavows any such chal-
lenge here. We cannot find any error in the District 
Court's decision to credit Dr. Fiske's testimony as that 
of an expert, or the decision to rely on that testimony as 
evidence of sexual stereotyping at Price Waterhouse. 
Finally, the firm challenges the District Court's reli-
ance on comments partners made about other female 
candidates, contending that the trial judge intentionally 
misconstrued these statements in order to find in them 
evidence of stereotypical thinking. One partner stated 
that he could never vote for a female partner. One suc-
cessful female candidate was criticized for being a 
"women's libber," and two other unsuccessful women 
were characterized as curt, brusque, and abrasive; "Ma 
Barker"; and "one of the boys." 618 F. Supp. at 1117. 
It is of course impossible to misconstrue the sentiment 
behind a categorical opposition to all fem ale partnership 
candidates. Despite the fact that the firm took no steps 
to admonish this partner for his statement, which he 
made just one year before Hopkins came up for consider-
ation, Price Waterhouse suggests the comment is essen-
tially irrelevant because it was obviously ignored by the 
Policy Board and was "of no further concern . . . by the 
time that plaintiff was proposed." Brief for Appellee-
Cross Appellant at 37. The firm also argues that the 
comment about one candidate being a "women's libber" 
., 
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cannot be viewed as evidence of discrimination because 
the woman in question became a partner; Price Water-
house similarly attempts to dismiss the references describ-
ing one woman as "Ma Barker" and "one of the boys" 
as comments utterly devoid of stereotypical attitudes, re-
flecting nothing more than the author's view that this par-
ticular woman was a "hick" who socialized too often with 
non-professional staff. These arguments miss the mark. 
The District Court did not purport to find that any of 
these comments determined the fate of the women in 
question, reflected the views of the Policy Board itself, or 
had a direct impact on plaintiff's candidacy. Rather, the 
court relied on them as evidence that partners at Price 
Waterhouse often evaluated female candidates in terms of 
their sex. We find nothing erroneous in such reliance; 
on the contrary, we believe it is eminently correct. 
In sum, there is ample support in the record for the 
District Court's finding that the partnership selection 
process at Price Waterhouse was impermissibly infected 
by stereotypical attitudes towards female candidates. 
2. The District Court's Legal Theory 
Price Waterhouse also challenges the liability deter-
mination below on two purely legal grounds. First, it 
contends that Hopkins did not prove "intentional" dis-
crimination on the part of the Policy Board, but only 
"unconscious" sexual stereotyping by unidentified part-
ners who participated in the selection process. Second, 
the firm argues that even if such a showing is sufficient 
to satisfy Title VII's intent requirement, Hopkins did 
not prove, and the District Court did not find, that this 
unconscious stereotyping, or the firm's conscious failure 
to prevent it, actually caused her partnership denial. 
Hopkins claimed, and the District Court found, that 
Price Waterhouse treated her differently than the 87 male 
candidates nominated in 1982 by subjecting her can-
didacy to an evaluation system that the firm knew or 
i8 
should have known allowed sexual stereotypes to influence 
decisions on partnership selection. She made a substan-
tial showing of the role such sexual stereotypes played 
in the selection system generally and in her own can-
didacy in particular-a showing made all the more re-
markable by the educational background and sophistica-
tion of the participants in that system. Price Waterhouse 
tries to escape liability for this sex-based disparate treat-
ment by arguing that it was not "intentional"-the indi-
vidual partners who evaluated plaintiff on the basis of 
stereotypes did so unconsciously, and plaintiff failed to 
show the extent to which this stereotyping influenced the 
ultimate decisionmaker in this case, the Policy Board. In 
so arguing, defendant seeks refuge in the collegial nature 
of its decisionmaking body, in the subtle and insidious 
nature of the discrimination involved, and in a mistaken 
notion of the intent requirement in disparate treatment 
cases. 
As the Supreme Court noted a decade ago in Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324 (1977), disparate treatment is a type of inten-
tional discrimination whereby an "employer simply treats 
some people less favorably than others because of their 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Proof of dis-
criminatory motive is crucial, although it can in some 
situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences 
in treatment." Id. at 335-36 n.15 (emphasis added). 
Title VII is, of course, remedial rather than punitive in 
nature. It is designed to remove "'artificial, arbitrary 
and unnecessary barriers to employment where those bar-
riers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of 
racial or other impermissible classification.'" McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973) 
(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 
(1971)). In keeping with this purpose, the Supreme 
Court has never applied the concept of intent so as to 
excuse an artificial, gender-based employment barrier 
simply because the employer involved did not harbor the 
• 
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requisite degree of ill-will towards the person in question. 
As the evidentiary framework established in McDonnell 
Douglas makes clear, the requirements of discriminatory 
motive in disparate treatment cases does not function as 
a "state of mind" element, but as a method of ensuring 
that only those arbitrary or artificial employment bar-
riers that are related to an employee or applicant's race, 
sex, religion, or national origin are eliminated." Nor is 
this surprising, as unwitting or ingrained bias is no less 
injurious or worthy of eradication than blatant or cal-
culated discrimination.6 Hopkins demonstrated, and the 
District Court found, that she was treated less favorably 
than male candidates because of her sex. This is suffi-
cient to establish discriminatory motive; the fact that 
some or all of the partners at Price Waterhouse may 
have been unaware of that motivation, even within them-
selves, neither alters the fact of its existence nor excuses 
it. See Lynn v. Regents of the University of California, 
656 F.2d 1337, 1343 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981) ( "when plain-
5 In Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248 (1981), the Supreme Court .noted that an employer's 
erroneous assessment of a protected applicant's qualifications 
does not, by itself, subject the employer to Title VII liability. 
Such an assessment is of course an arbitrary employment bar-
rier, but it is not based on the applicant's race, sex, religion, 
or national origin and is thus not within the scope of the 
statute. Id. at 259. 
6 In Lynn v. Regents of the University of Californw, 656 
F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982), 
the Ninth Circuit observed that it was once accepted wisdom 
that women were unfit to vote, practice law, or undertake pro-
fessional careers. These beliefs were no less pernicious merely 
because those subscribing to them may not have suspected 
their own discriminatory attitudes. Today " [ o J ther concepts 
reflect a discriminatory attitude more subtly; the subtlety does 
not, however, make the impact less significant or less unlaw-
ful. It serves only to make the courts' task of scrutinizing 
attitudes and motivation, in order to determine the true rea-
son for employment decisions, more exacting." Id. at 1343 n.5. 
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tiffs establish that decisions regarding . . . employment 
are motivated by discriminatory attitudes relating to race 
or sex, or are rooted in concepts which reflect such atti-
tudes, however subtly, courts are obligated to afford the 
relief provided by Title VII"), cert denied, 459 U.S. 
823 (1982). 
Price Waterhouse nevertheless argues that Hopkins has 
failed to establish a discriminatory motive on the part of 
the actual decisionmaker in this case, the Policy Board, 
because she has not demonstrated the exact impact that 
stereotyped comments had on the Board's ultimate deci-
sion. The faulty logic upon which this contention is 
premised, however, would, if accepted, place an enormous, 
perhaps insurmountable, burden on Title VII litigants 
who challenge the employment decisions of collegial bodies 
such as partnerships. It is the rare case indeed in which 
a group of sophisticated professionals such as the Policy 
Board would formally pass on the candidacy of a woman 
or other member of a protected group in the unvarnished 
terms of the Price Waterhouse partner who objected to 
all female candidates as a matter of principle. Here, 
Hopkins presented evidence that stereotypical attitudes 
towards women had manifested themselves in connection 
with the partnership bids of other women and, more im-
portantly, that these stereotypes had been brought to bear 
on her own candidacy. In addition, she offered the expert 
testimony of Dr. Fiske, who concluded that these attitudes 
played a "major" role in plaintiff's failure to make part-
ner. In particular, Dr. Fiske noted that these stereo-
typical attitudes accounted for the extremely negative re-
actions of Hopkins' critics to behavior that other partners 
praised in her-negative reactions, moreover, which the 
Policy Board formally recognized in its recommendation 
by stating that plaintiff needed to learn social grace. The 
District Court therefore had ample support for its con-
clusion that stereotyping played a significant role m 
blocking plaintiff's admission to the partnership. 
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In Burdine, of course, the Court made clear that ulti-
mately the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on the 
issue of intentional discrimination. While the Court noted 
that this burden requires the plaintiff to prove that "a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the em-
ployer," 450 U.S. at 256, it has never ruled definitively 
that the plaintiff must establish that impermissible dis-
crimination was the predominant or "but for" motivating 
factor,7 and the circuits have divided on the question.8 
7 In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 
(1976), the Court stated in a footnote that, for purposes of 
proving pretext, a Title VII plaintiff need not prove that race 
was the "sole" basis of the adverse employment action, add-
ing that "no more is required to be shown than that race was 
a 'but for' cause." Id. at 282 n.10. Significantly, "[t]he 'no 
more need be shown' phrase indicates that a showing of but 
for causation would be sufficient; it does not signify that such 
a showing is necessary to prevail." Lewis v. University of 
Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 921 (3d Cir. 1983) (Adams, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984) (emphasis in 
original). Neither the majority of circuit courts nor the com-
mentators that have addressed the question have viewed the 
McDonald footnote as definitive. See note 8 infra and Brodin, 
The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Mo,tive Title VII 
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82, Gol. L. Rev. 292, 302 
(1982). 
More recently, the Court ruled in an analogous setting that 
for purposes of establishing an unfair labor practice under 
the National Labor Relations Act, a showing that antiunion 
bias was a substantial or motivating factor in an adverse em-
ployment decision is sufficient to shift to the employer the 
burden of proving that the decision would have been the same 
even absent such bias. National Labor Relations Board v. 
Transportation Management Corrp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). 
The Court noted that in such mixed-motive cases, "[i] t is 
fair that [the] employer bear the risk that the influence of 
legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he know-
ingly created the risk and because the risk was created not 
by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing." Id. at 403. 
8 Only two circuits have adopted the "but for" test of causa-
tion. See Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 
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McDonnell Douglas and Burdine set out the analytical 
framework necessary to establish intentional discrimina-
tion when there is no direct evidence of such discrimina-
tion and, consistent with this analysis, it is inappropriate 
to require the defendant, simply on the basis of the infer-
ence of discrimination raised by plaintiff's prima facie 
case, to prove that discrimination was not the but for 
cause of the challenged employment decision. See Toney 
v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Here, 
however, Hopkins has offered direct evidence that her 
gender was a significant motivating factor in her failure 
to make partner, and Price Waterhouse's claim that it 
had other legitimate reasons for its decision in no way 
negates her showing. At this point, the utility of the 
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine analysis is at an end, for the 
question is no longer whether plaintiff was "treat [ed] 
... less favorably than others because of . . . [her] sex," 
915-17 (3d Cir. 1983) and Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 
553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977). Four others have adopted a 
"substantial factor" test under which race or sex need not 
be the determinative factor, as long as it had a substantial 
impact on the decision in question. See Blalock v. Metals 
Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff 
must show employer's decision "more likely than not" moti-
vated by impermissible criterion); Miles v. M.N.C. Corrp., 750 
F.2d 867, 875 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff must show dis-
criminatory motive was "significant or substantial factor" in 
employment decision); Fadhl v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984) (liability may 
be imposed on finding that sex was a "significant factor"); 
Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 
19-80) ( discrimination must be a "significant factor") . The 
Eighth Circuit has adopted an even less stringent standard 
that permits a plaintiff to establish Title VII liability simply 
by showing that an unlawful motive "played some part in the 
employment decision." Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323 
(8th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (emphasis added). This circuit 
has not yet resolved the question. See American Federation 
of Government Employees v. FLRA, 716 F.2d 47, 51 n.2 
(D.C. Cir.1983). 
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Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15, but rather whether 
that less favorable treatment in fact caused the adverse 
decision she challenges. 
Recognizing that " [ d] iscriminatory intent is simply 
not amenable to calibration," Personnel Administrator v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979), courts have struggled 
to resolve the difficult questions of causation that arise 
in mixed-motive cases such as this. While most circuits 
have not confronted the question squarely, the consensus 
among those that have is that once a Title VII plaintiff 
has demonstrated by direct evidence that discriminatory 
animus played a significant or substantial role in the 
contested employment decision, the burden shifts to the 
employer to show that the decision would have been the 
same absent discrimination. Blalock v. Metals Trades, 
Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 1985) (where plaintiff 
shows by preponderance of evidence that decision more 
likely than not motivated by impermissible criterion, bur-
den shifts to employer to show decision would have been 
the same); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875 n.9 
(11th Cir. 1985) (if plaintiff offers direct evidence that 
discrimination was substantial factor in decision, burden 
shifts to employer to show decision would have been the 
same absent discrimination); see also Bibbs v. Block, 778 
F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (once 
plaintiff shows unlawful motive played some part in deci-
sion, liability is established; defendant may limit relief 
by showing decision would have been the same absent 
discrimination); Fadhl v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984) (where plain-
tiff shows unlawful motive was a significant factor, lia-
bility is established; defendant may limit relief by demon-
strating decision would have been the same absent dis-
crimination). But see Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 
725 F.2d 910, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must 
show discriminatory animus was the but for cause of 
decision), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 ( 1984). We believe 
that where a Title VII plaintiff has already discharged 
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her burden of demonstrating that the employment deci-
sion was based on impermissible bias, 
it is unreasonable and destructive of the purposes of 
Title VII to require the plaintiff to establish in addi-
tion the difficult hypothetical proposition that, had 
there been no discrimination, the employment deci-
sion would have been made in [her J favor. We chose 
instead to place the burden upon the employer to 
show, by "clear and convincing evidence," that the 
unlawful factor was not the determinative one. 
Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d at 1366 (emphasis in original) .
9 
This, of course, is precisely the rule the District Court 
applied below. We believe this burden-shifting mechanism 
is appropriately invoked in a mixed-motive case such as 
this, and accordingly we find no error in the District 
Court's allocation of burdens. 
Finally, Price Waterhouse argues that the District 
Court's findings conclusively demonstrate that Hopkins' 
unappealing personality, rather than any unlawful dis-
crimination on the part of the Policy Board, was the but 
for cause of her failure to make partner. The trial judge 
9 In Toney, the court declined to apply this test, originally 
set out in Day v. Matthews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.G. Cir. 1976
), 
to an individual claim of disparate treatment. The c
ourt 
.noted that the Day v. Matthews test was typically applied 
in 
disparate impact class actions in which the class plain
tiffs 
prevailed simply by showing generalized discrimination
 in 
the employment unit, without demonstrating that each i
ndi-
vidual class member had actually suffered directly from 
that 
discrimination. In Toney, the p.Jaintiff, in accordance wi
th 
Burdine, had relied on circumstantial evidence of discrimin
a-
tion "in the air" to prove his prima facie case. As we n
oted 
above, in such circumstances it is inappropriate to shif
t to 
the employer the burden of proving that discrimination 
was 
not the determinative cause of the adverse decision. H
ere, 
however, Hopkins has shown by direct evidence not just "b
ack-
ground noise" of discrimination, but that "unlawful disc
rim-
ination had been applied against [her] in the particular em
-
ployment decision [at issue]." Toney, 705 F.2d at 1366 (em
-
phasis in original). As we explain above, this crucial fin
ding 
justifies the burden-shifting rule we apply in this case. 
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expressly noted that the concerns raised over Hopkins' 
dealings with staff found support in the record and "pro-
vided ample justification for the complaints that form 
the basis of the Policy Board's decision." 618 F. Supp. at 
1114. Morever, the judge acknowledged that because of 
Hopkins' apparent lack of interpersonal skills, "the Court 
cannot say that she would have been elected to partner-
ship if the Policy Board's decision had not been tainted 
by sexually biased evaluations." Id. at 1120. Contrary 
to Price Waterhouse's contentions, however, these state-
ments are not inconsistent with the court's liability de-
termination. On the contrary, they are perfectly in keep-
ing with the fact that this is a case of mixed-motivation. 
The District Court simply found that both plaintiff's 
personality and the sexually stereotyped reactions to her 
personality were significant factors in the firm's decision 
to hold her candidacy. Because Price Waterhouse could 
not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 
impermissible bias was not the determinative factor, how-
ever, the District Court properly found for Hopkins on 
the question of liability. 
B. Relief 
Turning to the question of relief, the District Court 
found that Hopkins was entitled to recover backpay from 
the date of her partnership denial until the date of her 
resignation, but disallowed any such recovery because the 
parties had attempted to bifurcate the trial and postpone 
consideration of the issue of damages without the knowl-
edge or consent of the court. With respect to post-
designation damages, the District Court found that Hop-
kins had failed to demonstrate that she had been con-
structively discharged and therefore was ineligible both 
for backpay subsequent to the date of her resignation and 
an order directing that she be made a partner. 
The facts Hopkins proffered in support of her con-
structive discharge claim are undisputed. She made clear 
both at trial and during the course of her employment 
with Price Waterhouse that consideration for partnership 
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was an absolute prerequisite for any job she would take. 
Indeed, she left Touche Ross when her husband's success-
ful partnership bid eliminated her own chances for part-
nership, and she threatened to resign in 1981 when Price 
Waterhouse suggested that her husband's status as a 
Touche Ross partner might preclude her consideration for 
partnership at the firm. Nor does defendant take issue in 
any way with the District Court's finding that following 
her initial failure to make partner and OGS's decision not 
to re-propose her, it was "very unlikely" that Hopkins 
would ever become a partner at Price Waterhouse. It is 
true that plaintiff could have stayed on at the firm as a 
senior manager and that at least one partner urged her 
to do so. On the other hand, the customary and nearly 
unanimous practice at Price Waterhouse, as at most other 
accounting firms, is for senior managers who have been 
passed over for partnership to resign, and one of the 
OGS partners who strongly opposed Hopkins' candidacy 
advised her to do just that. 
In ruling that this showing did not suffice to make out 
a claim of constructive discharge, the District Court 
relied on Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 
where this court stated that in order to prevail on such 
a claim, an employee must establish that the employer 
"deliberately made . . . working conditions intolerable 
and drove [the employee] into 'an involuntary quit.'" 
Id. at 1176 (quoting Retail Store Employees Union Local 
880 v. National Labor Relations Board, 419 F.2d 329, 
332 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ). We agree that, taken at face 
value, this language sets forth a stringent standard. We 
believe that the District Court's literal interpretation of 
that language was misplaced, however, in view of the 
underlying facts in Clark, as well as decisions in cases 
following it. To begin with, a number of cases, including 
one relied upon by this court in Clark, have rejected the 
notion that the employer must have the specific intent of 
forcing the · employee to quit. See, e.g., Goss v. Exxon 
Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984); 
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Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982); 
Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co., 617 F.2d 
61, 66 ( 5th Cir. 1980). These courts have instead held 
that it is sufficient if the employer simply tolerates dis-
criminatory working conditions that would drive a reason-
able person to resign. In addition, Clark and cases subse-
quent to it reveal that the intolerableness of working 
conditions is very much a function of the reasonable ex-
pectations of the employee, including expectations of 
promotion or advancement. Thus, in Clark, the court 
noted that the plaintiff, like Hopkins here, "reasonably 
expected ... opportunities for advancement" and that the 
employer's actions "essentially locked [her] into a posi-
tion from which she could apparently obtain no relief." 
665 F.2d at 1174. Similarly, in Parrett v. City of Con-
nersville, Indiana, 737 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1145 ( 1985), the Seventh Circuit found 
that plaintiff's transfer, without loss of pay, from chief 
of detectives to line captain, a dead-end position requiring 
plaintiff to do virtually nothing, was a form of enforced 
idleness both humilating and detrimental to a person with 
the career goals and ambition of the plaintiff. And in 
Goss, the Third Circuit upheld a district court's finding 
that an employer's discriminatory transfer of plaintiff to 
a less lucrative sales territory, combined with its in-
different response to her protests of that action, so de-
bilitated and humiliated her that it amounted to a con-
structive discharge. 747 F.2d 885. In each of these cases 
there were, of course, other indicia of discriminatory 
animus, but that is equally true here, where Hopkins 
faced the prospect of working with a number of partners, 
including two in her own office, who considered her 
brusque, abrasive, masculine, and overly aggressive. 
We continue to adhere to the view, first set forth in 
Clark, that the mere fact of discrimination, without 
more, is insufficient to make out a claim of constructive 
discharge. Similarly, we believe that discrimination is 
still best attacked within the context of existing employ-
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ment relations. Price Waterhouse's decision to deny Hop-
kins partnership status, however, coupled with the OGS's 
failure to renominate her; would have been viewed by any 
reasonable senior manager in her position as a career-
ending action. Accordingly, it amounted to a constructive 
discharge. We believe the District Court erred in ruling 
otherwise and therefore reverse that portion of its de-
cision and remand the case so that the court may conduct 
further proceedings in order to determine the appropri-
ate relief. 
In assessing Hopkins' post-resignation damages, the 
District Court must of necessity consider much if not all 
of the evidence plaintiff sought to introduce in connection 
with her claim for backpay for the period between her 
partnership denial and her resignation. We believe, there-
fore, that the District Court, in determining damages on 
remand, should also compensate Hopkins for this period. 
In so ruling, we do not wish to condone unauthorized bi-
furcation of T'itle VII or any other actions, nor are we 
confident that we would require such a re-determination 
were it not for our remand. The District Court itself, 
however, expressly found that Hopkins was entitled to 
recover pre-resignation damages, and there is no sug-
gestion in the record that she was in any way responsible 
for the decision to postpone the presentation of evidence 
in this issue. We are somewhat troubled by the fact that 
the District Court's penalty for that decision fell solely 
on plaintiff and resulted in a complete windfall for Price 
Waterhouse, whose attorneys joined equally in the un-
authorized stipulation. In any event, the discourtesy and 
inconvenience to the court occasioned by the stipulation is 
largely moot in light of our remand, and we therefore 
believe it appropriate for the court to award Hopkins 
the full relief to which she is entitled. 
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District 
Court's liability determination and reverse and remand 
the case for the determination of appropriate damages 
and relief. 
1 
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The majority 
implicitly adopts a novel theory of liability under Title 
VII, but neither confronts the novelty of the theory nor 
gives it any intelligible bounds. Further, as it must to 
reach the result, it bends out of recognition this court's 
holding in Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) . These prodigies are necessary for the outcome 
because the district court's judgment cannot be sustained 
under any hitherto accepted notion of Title VII liability.1 
The theory is one of sexual stereotyping. See, e.g., 
Majority Opinion ("Maj.") at 12, 17, 20. An analysis 
grounding Title VII liability in such stereotypes may well 
be meritorious; but its articulation would require care. 
No one argues that Congress intended entirely to over-
turn Justice Douglas's observation that "the two sexes 
are not fungible." Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 
187, 193 (1946). Dismissal of a male employee because 
he routinely appeared for work in skirts and dresses 
would surely reflect a form of sexual stereotyping, but it 
would not, merely on that account, support Title VII 
liability. Nor, I suppose, does anyone contend that use 
of the feminine pronoun "she" to describe a female is 
a forbidden "evaluat [ion of] female candidates in terms 
of their sex." Maj. at 17. 
The court makes no effort to delineate the theory, to 
draw a line between permissible and impermissible. There 
is a good reason not to do so: the record here provided 
no causal connection between Hopkins's fate and such 
stereotyping as went on among Price Waterhouse's 662 
partners. The evidence of sexual stereotyping '2 is care-
1 The majority's treatment of the relief issues, however, 
seems correct. 
2 The line between legally permissible and legally imper-
missible stereotyping has yet to be drawn. When I use the 
term, I refer simply to whatever expressions have been so 
characterized by the district court or the majority. 
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fully culled from a mass of critical comments on the 
plaintiff's abrasiveness with no sex link whatever. The 
district court determined that these comments were well 
founded in fact, represented standards applied to men 
and women alike, and were the true basis of the firm's 
decision. 618 F. Supp. at 1114-16. The questionable re-
marks consist, with one marginal exception, of two types. 
First, some of Hopkins's supporters used such stereotypes 
in speaking of her or in voicing their speculations as to 
the workings of her opponents' minds. Second, other 
partners had used such terms in other years in speaking 
of other female candidates. Thus, though some forms of 
sexual stereotyping can be discriminatory, the instances 
here, however they may be characterized, were at most 
"generalized discrimination within the employment unit," 
Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d at 1367, rather than discrimi-
nation "in the particular employment decision for which 
retroactive relief was sought," id. at 1366 ( emphasis 
in original) . 
Under Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981), and Toney, this 
can do no more than establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. In functional terms, it put upon the defend-
ant the burden of showing that its stated reasons were 
not pretextual. Defendant met that burden. The district 
court made unchallenged findings that the reasons given 
were "not fabricated as a pretext for discrimination." 
618 F. Supp. at 1114. It also found that Price Water-
house had "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for dis-
tinguishing between the plaintiff and the male partners 
with whom she compares herself." Id. at 1115. This 
clearly restored the burden to plaintiff to show that she was 
the victim of unlawful discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
at 256. The district court's findings that Hopkins's "con-
duct provided ample justification for the complaints 
[about her unpleasantness] that formed the basis of the 
Policy Board's decision," 618 F. Supp. at 1114, clearly 
shows that plaintiff did not meet that burden. 
3 
The district court summarized its view of the evidence 
of discrimination in these terms: 
Discriminatory stereotyping of females was permitted 
to play a part. [1] Comments influenced by sex 
stereotypes were made by partners; [2] the firm's 
evaluation process gave substantial weight to these 
comments; and [3] the partnership failed to address 
the conspicuous problem of stereotyping in partner-
ship evaluations. [ 4] While these three factors might 
have been innocent alone, they combined to produce 
discrimination in the case of this plaintiff. 
618 F. Supp. at 1120. I examine these elements in the 
same order. 
1. Partner comments influenced by stereotypes. The 
bulk of the comments instanced as stereotyped are by 
Hopkins's supporters. One said that opponents focused on 
Hopkins's profanity "because its [sic] a lady using foul 
language," another characterized her as "macho," and 
another said she had "matured from a tough-talking, 
somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr. to an authoritative, 
formidable, but much more appealing lady partner candi-
date." Id. at 1117. The majority evidently refers to these 
as "stereotypes ... brought to bear on [Hopkins's] own 
candidacy," Maj. at 20, but there is no reason to suppose 
they harmed it.~ The psychological speculations of Hop-
kins's boosters cannot by any stretch be "direct evidence 
that her gender was a significant motivating factor in 
her failure to make partner." Id. at 22. 
As for the "smoking gun" remark by her most ardent 
supporter, Thomas Beyer ("walk more femininely," 
etc.), there is no reason to suppose that it represented 
any more than one partner's speculations. The district 
court was clearly erroneous in characterizing the state-
ment as having been made by Beyer in fulfillment of his 
3 Cf. Maj. at 13 ("The comments of Hopkins' supporters 
may or may not have harmed her candidacy .... ") 
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"responsib [ility] for telling her what problems the Pol-
icy Board had identified with her candidacy." 618 F. 
Supp. at 1117. Hopkins's own testimony showed that it 
was Joseph Connor ( Beyer's superior) who bore the re-
sponsibility for informing Hopkins of the reasons for 
the decision and who did so. Tr. 87-97. Hopkins testi-
fied that Connor made no remarks about her sex. Id. at 
95. After speaking with Connor she sought Beyer's 
advice, along with that of several other partners. Id. 
at 98. Beyer had been on vacation, and he made no 
claim whatever to inside information on the discussions 
of the Policy Board: he and Hopkins "tried to guess 
who some of the [opposing partners] might be." Id. at 
89 ( emphasis added). Neither her account of that con-
versation nor any part of her testimony contradicts the 
natural inference that his advice was just that: personal 
speculation as to possibly winning strategies. Id. at 102. 
Beyer's testimony confirms this interpretation: Connor 
had said nothing to Beyer suggesting that Hopkins's dress, 
walk, or any aspect of her personal appearance was a 
problem, but Beyer believed such a change might help. 
Id. at 168. He never articulated the basis for the belief. 
The majority tries to shore up the misconception by 
imputing to Price Waterhouse an "artificial assumption 
that Beyer . . . would be kept completely in the dark as 
to the Policy Board's views on her candidacy." Maj. 
at 14. No one assumes any such thing. The issue is 
whether Beyer was summarizing the Policy Board's 
views or was offering his own helpful suggestions. The 
evidence of Hopkins and Beyer is clear that it was the 
latter. The only faint evidence the other way came from 
Roger Marcellin, a partner in another office who did field 
work for the Policy Board. Tr. at 305-07. He simply 
assumed ( "ha [ d] no doubt") that Beyer would be re-
porting "where the problems were." Id. at 316. Beyer's 
and Hopkins's testimony on the subject makes clear that 
Marcellin's guesswork was inaccurate. 
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In the majority's most dramatic imaginative leap, the 
stereotyped language of Hopkins's supporters is said, 
without a shred of supportive evidence, to have "len[t] 
credence to [stereotyped complaints of Hopkins's critics] 
and unwittingly undermin [ed] the support they sought 
to provide." Maj. at 13 n.3. The creativity of the 
proposition is underscored by its building in an assump-
tion that stereotyped critiques by Hopkins's opponents 
exist-an assumption for which the majority identifies 
no record support. 
The only remark by a Hopkins opponent that can be 
characterized as man if es ting sexual stereotyping is the 
facetious suggestion that she should take a "course at 
charm school." The smoke from this gun seems to me 
rather wispy. It was embedded in the following comment: 
Contacts with Ann are only casual-several mtgs at 
OGS and MMGS sessions. However, she is consist-
ently annoying and irritating-believes she knows 
more than anyone about anything, is not afraid to 
let the world know it. Suggest a course at charm 
school before she is considered for admission. I 
would be embarrassed to introduce her as a ptnr. 
Def. Exh. 27. 
The substance of the remark has nothing to do with 
sex stereotypes. It fits with the many other characteriza-
tions of Hopkins ( "too assertive, overly critical of others, 
impatient with her staff"; it required "diplomacy, 
patience and guts to work with her"; 618 F. Supp. 
at 1114) for which, the district court found, plaintiff's 
"conduct provided ample justification," id. The objec-
tion, of course, is to the opponent's silly phrase. The 
reference was doubtless sex-linked, and the majority is 
not unfair in characterizing it as a "somewhat derogatory 
colloquialism." Maj. at 13-14 n.4. Thus it may be more 
"sexist" than a comment, such as might be made of a 
young man, wanting in character, that he ought to be 
"sent to military school." But to find discrimination by 
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Price Waterhouse based simply on this remark is "ut-
terly implausible." See Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 
788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discussing criteria 
for disregarding district courts' findings of fact in Title 
VII cases). 
The district court and the majority take refuge in 
comments made by Price Waterhouse partners in evalu-
ations of other women in other years. 618 F. Supp. at 
1117; Maj. at 16-17. These included one plainly beyond 
the pale-a remark by a partner that he "could not con-
sider any woman seriously as a partnership candidate 
and believed that women were not even capable of func-
tioning as senior managers." 618 F. Supp. at 1117. So 
we know that, at least at some time in the past, there 
was one male chauvinist pig rampant among the Price 
Waterhouse partners. But there is no evidence that this 
troglodyte ever influenced a single other partner. His 
comment was not repeated after 1981, perhaps because 
the informal atmosphere in the firm made such remarks 
unacceptable. In any event, no one claims he played any 
role in the relevant evaluation. 
The other remarks (still relating to other evaluations 
in other years) are ambiguous. For instance, it had been 
said of one woman candidate that she acted too much 
like "one of the boys," 618 F. Supp. at 1117, but this was 
apparently a criticism of her for socializing too much 
with the clerical staff and not enough with the profession-
als. Def. Exh. 64, tab 22. Even the majority recognizes 
that these remarks had no "direct impact on plaintiff's 
candidacy." Maj. at 17. But it takes them as evidence 
that partners at Price Waterhouse "often evaluate fe-
male candidates in terms of their sex." Id. 
In a case where alleged sexual stereotyping had a 
demonstrable connection to the plaintiff, a careful analy-
sis of such remarks would be in order. Such an analysis 
would begin with the recognition that not all sex-based 
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phrases are sexist. Our vocabulary is full of such 
phrases, some of which have gradually detached them-
selves from any genuine link to sex, or even switched sex. 
Thus "doll," originally a slang phrase for a "convention-
ally pretty and shapely young woman, ... whose function 
is to elevate the status of a male and to inspire general 
lust," see NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG 108 (R. 
Chapman ed. 1986), has come in some contexts to refer 
to any "notably decent, pleasant, generous person," as in 
"Isn't he a doll?" That is the way language evolves, 
especially in a lively, spontaneous culture such as ours. 
Words themselves are metaphors, and it is in their nature 
to acquire meanings completely detached from original, 
concrete detail, whether or not sex related. Thus the 
phrase "BS" clearly relies on no distinction between cows 
and bulls. 
Here, the phrase "one of the boys" was used in a sex-
neutral sense: it was used of a woman, and since it evi-
dently referred to her camaraderie with clerical staff at 
Price Waterhouse, the statistical probability is overwhelm-
ing that they were predominantly women. The phrase's 
connotation of easy familiarity (an "ordinary, amiable 
man ... without side or lofty dignity; = ORDINARY 
JOE: His Eminence was trying to be one of the boys," 
id. at 305) easily escapes its masculine origins. The 
phrase does not manifest sexism, notwithstanding the 
solemn avowals of the plaintiff, the district court and the 
majority. 
But this case does necessitate a study of just what 
expressions Congress may have wished to wash from the 
American tongue. The remark related to another candi-
date in another year. It plainly was not "direct evidence 
that [Hopkins's] gender was a significant motivating 
factor in her failure to make partner." Maj. at 22. 
In discussing sex stereotyping, the district court gave 
great weight to the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, a wit-
ness purporting to be an expert in that field. She claimed 
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to be able to find forbidden stereotyping simply by read-
ing partners' comments-without information about the 
truth of the matters commented upon. Of course where 
the remarks themselves carry such a tint (if, for ex-
ample, a commenter had said, "She's too masculine"), 
anyone could do so. But ( apart from the "charm school" 
remark) no Hopkins detractor said any such thing. Dr. 
Fiske's expertise rose to the occasion. Her arts enabled 
her to detect sex stereotyping based largely on "the in-
tensity of the negative reaction." Tr. at 559. So if an 
observer characterized someone as "overbearing and ar-
rogant and abrasive and running over people," an expert 
such as Dr. Fiske could discern-and would, if the sub-
ject were a woman-that they stemmed from unconscious 
stereotypes. Dr. Fiske could do this without meeting the 
subject of the comment or making any inquiry into a 
possible factual basis. Id. at 569, 595-97. To an expert 
of Dr. Fiske's qualifications, it seems plain that no 
woman could be overbearing, arrogant or abrasive: any 
observations to that effect would necessarily be discounted 
as the product of stereotyping. If analysis like this is to 
prevail in federal courts, no employer can base any ad-
verse action as to a woman on such attributes. 
2. The evaluation process gave weight to such com-
ments. This generalization suffers precisely the defect 
of the first leg of the tripod of liability: it depends en-
tirely upon comments that could not have adversely 
affected Hopkins. Either they related to other candidacies 
in other years, or they represented her supporters' views 
or intuitions about her adversaries. All we have that con-
nects in any potentially adverse way with Hopkins is the 
"charm school" remark.4 
4 If this leg is in any way based on the firm's procedure of 
giving substantial weight to "no" votes, it is inconsistent with 
the district court's prior finding that "the firm's practice of 
giving 'no' votes great weight treated male and female candi-
dates in the same way." 618 F. Supp. at 1116. Se.e Mitchell 
v. Baldridge, 759, F.2d 80, 85 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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3. Neglect of duty to address problem of stereotyping. 
Key to the district court's finding of liability was Price 
Waterhouse's failure to institute special programs for 
sensitizing partners to sex stereotyping, or otherwise to 
stamp it out of the evaluation process. 618 F. Supp. at 
1120. This breaks new ground, blithely free of any effort 
to link it to any established legal principles. Nor is the 
new theory intellegibly defined. What set of facts triggers 
the duty? If such an omission is to ground liability, 
perhaps the plaintiff should bear an initial burden of 
demonstrating that gender stereotyping was more prob-
ably than not the cause of the adverse employment deci-
sion. The majority, like the district court, fails to clarify 
this important issue, perhaps because it is so clear that 
Hopkins failed to make such a showing. 
From the facts here, it looks as though the duty to 
sensitize has a hair trigger. The implications are serious. 
The more delicate the trigger, the more completely this 
court has dropped the requirement of intentional discrimi-
nation out of the law. As few employers can say with 
confidence that those who run its hiring and promotion 
are one hundred percent free of what may later be char-
acterized as forbidden stereotyping, the only safe course 
will be to institute programs of the sort approved by the 
district court. The rule turns Title VII from a prohibi-
tion of discriminatory conduct into an engine for rooting 
out sexist thoughts. 
4. Innocent alone, the three factors combined to pro-
duce discrimination in the case of this plaintiff. Such 
alchemy is mysterious. Having found that specific com-
plaints caused the Policy Board's adverse decision and 
that there was ample justification for the complaints, the 
district court took up the allegations of stereotyping :float-
ing in the Price Waterhouse ether and the remarkable 
intuitions of Dr. Fiske. 618 F. Supp. at 1117-20. The 






on Hopkins "might be attributed to sex stereotyping." 
Id. at 1118. It next determined that the commenters "may 
have been influenced by a sex bias." Id. It then pro-
gressed from "might" to "did," but never revealed how it 
reached the final ipse dixit. 
The evidence here establishes at most the existence of 
sexist attitudes. Thus there can be no doubt that this 
court's decision in Toney v. Block controls. The showing 
of "generalized discrimination" can at the most establish 
a prima facie case, requiring defendant to meet its burden 
of showing non-pretextual grou.nds for its action. The 
district court properly found those established, restoring 
the burden to plaintiff. 
The majority would eviscerate Toney by a clever name 
change: calling the case one of mixed motive, the ma-
jority looks to precedents in related areas where a 
party acting with one permissible motive and one unlaw-
ful one may prevail only by affirmatively proving that it 
would have acted as it did even if the forbidden motive 
were absent. I have no quarrel with this principle. See 
National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Man-
agement Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983); Mt. Healthy 
City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 
274, 287 (1977). But it has no relevance where, as here, 
discrimination has "not been specifically attributed to the 
employment decision of which the plaintiff complains." 
Toney, 705 F.2d at 1366. Toney does not permit a plain-
tiff to invoke the "mixed motive" concept whenever ( 1) 
he or she has shown only background evidence of some 
generalized discrimination and (2) defendant has proven 
that a non-pretextual reason "formed the basis" of the 
act. If this court is to deep-six Toney, it should do so 
en bane. 
There is not enough evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion to support a verdict for Hopkins under any estab-
lished approach to Title VII liability. The stereotype 
theory adopted by the district court should not be allowed 
' 
11 
to spring to life in a case where its occurrence is not 
plausibly related to the decision on plaintiff. If a court 
is to develop such a theory, it should do so in a context 
where it and the parties properly focus on what elements 
of sexual differentiation Congress may have sought to 
stamp out. If failure to provide sensitivity training is 
to be a ground of T'itle VII liability, there should be some 
illumination of the circumstances triggering the duty. 
And if Toney is to be overturned, it should not be by a 
panel of this court. I dissent. 
